SPF record in AWS Route 53

Setting up SPF on AWS Route 53 comes down to one TXT record at the root of your domain, holding a line that starts v=spf1 and names the servers allowed to send mail as you.

Route 53 is a DNS host inside the AWS Management Console. It answers DNS questions and stores the record, it does not run inboxes and it does not send mail.

The order below is the record first and the console second, because the pasting takes two minutes and the thinking is all in the line itself.

What the record says, and why it lives in DNS

SPF (Sender Policy Framework) is a published list of the sources that may send mail for your domain. When a mail server receives a message with your domain in the return path, it fetches the TXT record at that domain, checks whether the connecting server’s address is on the list, and writes the result into the message headers for the filters that run afterwards.

That lookup goes to whichever nameservers the registry lists for your domain, and to nowhere else. This is why the record has to be published where your DNS is answered, and why a record saved in the wrong console is invisible to the world, however correct its text.

A record in Route 53 only does anything if Route 53 is the service answering DNS for the domain. In the console open Hosted zones, select the domain, and read the four NS values shown for that zone. Those four values must match the nameservers set at the domain’s registrar. If the domain was registered through Route 53 under Registered domains this is usually already lined up, but if it was registered elsewhere, or there is more than one hosted zone for the same domain, the live nameservers may point somewhere else and anything added here does nothing.

Read the record before you paste it

An SPF record is a single string with three parts: the version tag, a list of mechanisms, and a closing catch-all. The version tag is always v=spf1, and a TXT record without it isn’t SPF at all.

Mechanisms come next, separated by spaces, and each one names a source of legitimate mail. include: pulls in another domain’s SPF record, which is how you authorise a mail provider or a newsletter tool: you name the hostname they publish and their list becomes part of yours. ip4: and ip6: name an address or a range directly, for a server you run yourself. a and mx authorise the hosts behind your domain’s own A and MX records.

redirect= hands the whole evaluation to another domain’s record; it’s a modifier rather than a mechanism, it can’t sit alongside an all, and it matters here because some hosts publish a record in that form on your behalf.

Each mechanism can carry a qualifier in front of it. + means pass and is the default, so include: and +include: are the same thing. - means fail, ~ means soft fail, and ? means neutral. The one qualifier that decides anything is the one on the last term.

That last term is all, and it says what to do about a source the mechanisms didn’t match. -all asks the receiver to fail unlisted mail. ~all asks it to accept the message and mark it suspect. ?all says nothing useful, and +all authorises the entire internet, which is worse than publishing no record.

Start with ~all while you’re confirming that the list is complete, then move to -all once a few weeks of ordinary sending have passed without a legitimate source turning up as unlisted. The choice between the two endings has its own page. Of the 316,600,902 domains carrying a grade in the September 2026 census, 84,153,064 (26.6%) end their record in ~all.

Two limits shape what you can put in the list. A domain gets one SPF record: a receiver that finds two TXT records starting v=spf1 treats the domain as having a permanent error, which counts the same as having none.

A record may also trigger at most ten DNS lookups during evaluation, counting each include:, a, mx and redirect= plus the lookups inside any record they pull in; an eleventh lookup fails the whole record. So a second sender goes into the existing record as another include:, and if the count is getting high, the mail provider’s help page usually says which of its hostnames costs the fewest lookups.

The record for AWS Route 53

Route 53 publishes exactly the TXT value typed into the Value field once Create records is clicked. It does not generate, check or supply the SPF text itself, that comes from whichever service sends the domain’s mail.

"v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

Compare that block against what your mail provider’s own setup page tells you to publish. The include: hostname has to match theirs character for character, because it’s a DNS name the receiver will resolve, and a typo resolves to nothing. If you send from more than one service, each gets its own include: in the same line, in any order, before the all.

Enter the record, click by click

1. Sign in to the AWS console and open Route 53.
2. In the left menu choose Hosted zones, then click the name of your domain.
3. Click Create record to start a new entry.
4. If the wizard offers routing-policy options, switch to the simple form by choosing Quick create record.
5. Leave the Record name field empty so the record sits at the domain itself.
6. Set Record type to TXT.
7. In the Value field enter the SPF text wrapped in double quotes, for example "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all".
8. Leave TTL at the default of 300 seconds.
9. Click Create records to save the entry.

Set Record type to TXT and leave the Record name field empty, since an empty name means the domain itself and Route 53 shows the domain alongside the field so it does not have to be retyped. Type the SPF text into the Value field inside double quotes, replacing the include: part with the value the reader’s own mail provider publishes. Leave TTL at its default of 300 seconds.

Before you save, read the value back once. The whole string sits on one line with single spaces between terms, no line break, no trailing space, and nothing after the all. If the form already shows a TXT record beginning v=spf1, you’re editing that one, and the only reason to be adding a new row is that no such record exists.

Some of the mistakes on this form belong to this console rather than to SPF.

• TXT values must be typed inside double quotes. Some DNS hosts quote the value for you, Route 53 does not, so the entry must read "v=spf1 ... ~all" and not v=spf1 ... ~all.
• Leaving the Record name field empty is what puts the record at the root. Typing the full domain name into that field makes Route 53 append the zone again, producing yourdomain.com.yourdomain.com, a record nothing ever checks.
• Only one v=spf1 TXT record belongs on a domain. Mailbox providers treat two of them as broken, so if a TXT record starting v=spf1 already exists at the root, edit it to add the new service rather than creating a second one.
• With several hosted zones, or several AWS accounts, it is easy to edit the wrong one. The zone being edited is the one whose NS values match the live nameservers.
• Amazon SES uses a different mechanism by default and SPF for SES is optional. If a custom MAIL FROM domain has been set up in SES, follow the SES instructions for that domain, since SES is a separate service from Route 53 and Route 53 only stores the DNS record.

Wait, then check it

DNS changes made in Route 53 are not instant and can take a few minutes up to a couple of hours to spread. The saved record appears back inside the same hosted zone, listed under the domain with its Record type shown as TXT.

Once the change has had time to spread, run the free scan against your domain. It fetches the record the way a receiving mail server would, reports whether one is present, whether it parses, how many lookups it costs and which qualifier it ends on, and it checks DKIM and DMARC in the same pass.

Reopen the hosted zone and check that the new row shows Record type TXT with an empty name and the quoted value exactly as entered.

If the scan reports no record when you’ve saved one, the order of suspects is the nameserver check at the top of this page, then a second v=spf1 row that has been sitting in the zone for years, then a value the form mangled on the way in. A record that’s present but reports as invalid is nearly always one of the limits above: two records, too many lookups, a redirect= with an all after it, or quote marks that ended up doubled.

What a missing or broken record costs you

Of the 316,600,902 domains carrying a grade in the September 2026 census, 166,497,698 (52.6%) publish no SPF record at all. For any of them, a receiver has no list to check the sending server against, so mail from the real mailboxes and mail from a forger’s server arrive carrying the same amount of evidence. Your genuine messages then depend on the receiver’s other filters, and a share of them land in spam for no reason you can see.

A malformed record ends in the same place. A permanent error reads as no policy, and some receivers treat a domain that publishes a broken policy less kindly than one that publishes nothing.

What SPF does on its own is narrower than people expect. It authorises the server, judged against the envelope sender that the recipient never sees, and the result is a header line rather than an instruction. A forged message that fails SPF can still be delivered, because until a DMARC policy tells receivers what to do with a failure, they’re under no obligation to do anything with it.

SPF is the list, DMARC is what turns the list into an instruction receivers act on, and the SPF guide covers how the two fit together and how to read the result headers on a message you’ve sent yourself.

Figures as of 5 September 2026, from the September 2026 edition of the defaults.exposed census. Census numbers move every month; the current values are on the census data page.