Not a website certificate: EKU, CA flags and missing names
The November 2026 census completed a TLS (Transport Layer Security) handshake with 222,252,692 apex domains and kept the leaf certificate each one presented. A website certificate describes itself in three fields. Its extended key usage (EKU) extension lists serverAuth, the purpose of a TLS server. Its basic constraints say it isn’t a certificate authority. Its subject alternative name (SAN) carries the DNS (Domain Name System) names it answers for.
98.3% of the leaves listed serverAuth. 3,752,084 domains, 1.7% of the base, presented a leaf that breaks at least one of the three: an EKU without serverAuth, a CA certificate served as the leaf, or no DNS name. The scanner’s TLS check accepted none of them. Most of them are self-signed or expired, and their names read like the defaults that servers and hosting panels hand out before anyone installs a real certificate. Another 406,312 leaves had no EKU extension and nothing else out of place, which TLS allows.
The larger group sits inside the serverAuth band. 9,297,044 leaves, 4.2% of the base, list clientAuth beside serverAuth. That is allowed today. Chrome’s root program requires every leaf issued from 15 March 2027 to list serverAuth and nothing else, and the served web is already moving: among leaves issued in August 2026, 4.8% still carried clientAuth.
What a website certificate says about itself
A certificate carries its own statement of what it is for. Three parts of it decide whether it’s a website certificate.
| Field | What a website leaf has | What the census counted |
|---|---|---|
| Extended key usage | The serverAuth purpose, OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 | Every OID in the extension, or none |
| Basic constraints | cA = false | Leaves with cA = true |
| Subject alternative name | At least one DNS name | Leaves with no SAN, or a SAN with no DNS name |
The EKU rules come from RFC 5280. When the extension is present, the certificate may be used only for the purposes it lists, so a leaf listing clientAuth (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) and nothing else isn’t a server certificate. When the extension is absent, RFC 5280 (Request for Comments) adds no restriction, though it lets an application insist on the extension, so a missing EKU isn’t a fault by itself.
Publicly trusted CAs work to a stricter profile. The CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements (version 2.3.1, section 7.1.2.7) say a subscriber certificate must have an EKU that includes serverAuth, may add clientAuth, and must not list code signing, email protection or anyExtendedKeyUsage. It must carry a SAN, and its cA flag must be false. Browsers no longer read names from the subject common name (CN): Chrome dropped that fallback in version 58, in 2017, so a leaf with no SAN can’t match any name in Chrome.
Why the EKU matters in 2026
Chrome’s root program wants the certificate hierarchies it trusts to serve TLS server authentication and nothing else. Version 1.8 of its policy, dated 5 February 2026, sets the dates in section 1.3.2. From 15 June 2026 Chrome phases out hierarchies that break the rule, and an intermediate CA disclosed on or after that day must list serverAuth only. From 15 March 2027, every leaf issued beneath a root Chrome trusts must list serverAuth and nothing else.
CAs moved ahead of the leaf date. Let’s Encrypt’s default profile stopped adding clientAuth on 11 February 2026, and the last profile that still offered it closed on 8 July 2026. A leaf issued before such a change keeps its clientAuth until it expires, so the served web carries both kinds for a while. The census reads only the leaf, so it can’t check the intermediates the June date governs.
The served leaves, banded
| Band | Domains | Share of the base | gTLD | ccTLD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| serverAuth only | 209,208,428 | 94.1% | 94.3% | 93.7% |
| serverAuth with clientAuth | 9,297,044 | 4.2% | 3.9% | 4.7% |
| serverAuth with other purposes | 1,121 | under 0.01% | under 0.01% | under 0.01% |
| No EKU extension | 3,735,086 | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.5% |
| EKU without serverAuth | 11,013 | 0.01% | under 0.01% | 0.01% |
The base is 222,252,692 domains, 149,393,774 under gTLDs and 72,858,918 under ccTLDs, and the five bands add up to it. 13,044,264 leaves, 5.9%, sit outside the serverAuth-only profile Chrome wants from March 2027. One served leaf carried anyExtendedKeyUsage without serverAuth, and none had an empty EKU. 11,416 serverAuth leaves also listed a purpose the Baseline Requirements forbid in a subscriber certificate, such as code signing or email protection.
The traits overlap. A CA certificate served as the leaf usually has no EKU and no SAN either: 98.6% of them lack an EKU and 96.9% lack a SAN. So the counts in Figure 1 can’t be added together.
Horizontal bar chart of the domains whose served leaf has each trait outside the website certificate profile. 9,297,044 carry clientAuth beside serverAuth, 3,735,086 have no EKU extension, 2,563,408 have no SAN and a name only in the common name, 1,788,419 are CA certificates, 1,055,670 have no name anywhere, 79,943 have a SAN with no DNS name, and 11,013 have an EKU without serverAuth.
Figure 1. Domains whose served leaf has each trait outside the website profile. A leaf can have more than one trait, so the bars overlap.
What the TLS check said about them
The scanner accepted 89.4% of all served leaves. It accepted none of the 3,752,084 leaves outside the profile. It also accepted none of the 3,735,086 with no EKU, a separate count. For the leaves outside the profile, the error the scanner’s library reported was self-signed for 57.8% and expired for 39.6%. The rest failed for other reasons, mostly the chain or the name. Leaves outside the profile mostly lack an EKU too: 88.7% had none.
The leaves carrying clientAuth are a different population. The scanner accepted 33.1% of them. It rejected 30.7% as expired and 33.4% because they didn’t carry the domain’s name. 3,074,665 of the leaves the scanner accepted list clientAuth, 1.5% of every accepted leaf.
Stacked bar chart of the error the scanner's TLS library reported for each group. Every served leaf: 89.4% accepted. Leaves carrying clientAuth: 33.1% accepted and 30.7% rejected as expired. No EKU: 61.6% rejected as self-signed and 37.3% as expired. CN only: 60.7% and 38.2%. CA certificates: 63.5% and 36.3%. No name anywhere: 53.4% and 46.6%.
Figure 2. The verdict the scanner’s TLS library reported for each group’s domains, one per domain. A leaf that is both self-signed and expired is reported as expired.
No EKU at all
3,735,086 leaves, 1.7% of the base, have no EKU extension. RFC 5280 puts no purpose restriction on such a leaf, so on its own it’s no fault. The Baseline Requirements do have publicly trusted CAs include an EKU, and the scanner accepted none of these leaves. It rejected 61.6% as self-signed and 37.3% as expired.
The issuer field says where most of them came from. The largest single group names no issuer organisation at all. Next come the placeholder names that certificate tools fill in when nobody types one, such as OpenSSL’s Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, and the defaults of hosting companies and control panels.
| Issuer organisation on the leaf | Domains | Share of the no-EKU leaves |
|---|---|---|
| (no issuer organisation) | 1,159,219 | 31.0% |
| Other placeholder text | 472,843 | 12.7% |
| Internet Widgits Pty Ltd (OpenSSL’s placeholder) | 411,655 | 11.0% |
| DreamHost | 234,643 | 6.3% |
| Placeholder: SomeOrganization | 167,324 | 4.5% |
| ispgateway | 165,837 | 4.4% |
| Placeholder: My Company Ltd | 152,133 | 4.1% |
| Placeholder: MyCompany Inc. | 133,574 | 3.6% |
| Plesk (incl. Parallels) | 123,157 | 3.3% |
| Placeholder: Default Company Ltd | 86,475 | 2.3% |
| Every other organisation (23,219 names) | 628,226 | 16.8% |
“Other placeholder text” gathers values such as localhost, XX, MyOrg and unknown. A blank issuer field counts as no issuer organisation. The table names the ten largest values and counts the rest together. An organisation outside the published list of products and placeholders is never named, because many are a single company’s own certificate.
CA certificates served as the leaf
1,788,419 leaves, 0.8% of the base, have cA = true: the server presents a certificate authority’s certificate as its own. 98.6% of them also have no EKU, and 77.8% carry the same common name as issuer and as subject. The scanner accepted none, rejecting 63.5% as self-signed and 36.3% as expired.
The largest hosting default is DreamHost’s: 234,640 domains present a CA certificate whose issuer organisation is DreamHost and whose common name is sni.dreamhost.com. The other large groups are OpenSSL’s placeholder organisation, with 371,108, certificates naming no issuer organisation, with 294,492, other placeholder text, with 183,773, and ispgateway, with 165,837.
Names only in the common name, or nowhere
2,563,408 leaves, 1.2% of the base, have no SAN and carry their only name in the CN. Chrome hasn’t matched names there since 2017. 1,055,670 more have no name anywhere, and 79,943 have a SAN that holds no DNS name. The scanner’s library still falls back to the CN when a leaf has no SAN, so it’s more lenient than Chrome here, but it accepted none of the 2,563,408 CN-only leaves either.
The names that are there read like defaults. Across the 3,619,078 leaves with no SAN, these were the most common values in the CN.
| Common name | Domains | Share of the leaves with no SAN |
|---|---|---|
| No common name | 1,055,670 | 29.2% |
| plesk | 291,058 | 8.0% |
| localhost | 261,093 | 7.2% |
| sni.dreamhost.com | 234,640 | 6.5% |
| webslave.ispgateway.de | 165,837 | 4.6% |
| default | 162,940 | 4.5% |
| localhost.localdomain | 113,941 | 3.1% |
| The domain’s own name | 84,369 | 2.3% |
| * (a lone asterisk) | 72,838 | 2.0% |
| default ssl certificate | 50,333 | 1.4% |
| Every other common name | 1,126,359 | 31.1% |
Only 84,369 of them, 2.3%, carry the domain’s own name in the CN.
An EKU without serverAuth
11,013 leaves list purposes without serverAuth, and 11,004 of those list clientAuth and nothing else. They are client certificates presented as a server’s own. 98.0% of them name Cloudflare as their issuer organisation. The scanner rejected all of them: 99.3% because their chain didn’t lead to a root it trusts, 50 for the wrong purpose and 26 because they had expired. The census sees that a server presented one, and not why.
clientAuth beside serverAuth, and the 2027 profile
Let’s Encrypt’s served leaves show its February change. Of the 228,689 Let’s Encrypt leaves issued from October 2025 to January 2026 that the census saw, all but 11 carried clientAuth. Of those issued in February, 44.5% did. From March to September, 7 of 60,501,577 did. Leaves from every other issuer fell later and more slowly: 44.2% of January’s carried clientAuth, 16.7% of May’s and 4.6% of July’s, the first full month after Chrome’s 15 June date for intermediates.
Line chart of the share of leaves served at the census that carry clientAuth, by the month each was issued, over the twelve months up to the census. Let's Encrypt: over 99.9% in January, 44.5% in February, under 0.1% in March. Every other issuer: 44.2% in January, 16.7% in May, 4.6% in July and 7.6% in August.
Figure 3. Share of served leaves carrying clientAuth beside serverAuth, by the month each leaf was issued.
The month is the certificate’s own start date, and the census sees only leaves still served when it ran, so the earlier months hold the long-lived ones. Of the 6,921,368 served leaves issued before December 2025, 46.1% carry clientAuth.
By issuer the split is wide. Among Google Trust Services’ served leaves, over 99.9% list serverAuth alone, and among Let’s Encrypt’s, 99.3%. At the other end, clientAuth is on 69.7% of GlobalSign’s and 51.2% of Actalis’s. Sectigo, with 3,569,627 leaves carrying clientAuth, and DigiCert, with 1,135,429, hold the most by count.
Stacked bar chart of the ten issuers serving the most leaves, splitting each issuer's served leaves into serverAuth only, serverAuth with clientAuth, and anything else. Google Trust Services over 99.9% serverAuth only, Let's Encrypt 99.3%, GoDaddy 98.6%, Sectigo 59.2%, DigiCert 76.4%, ZeroSSL 98.4%, Amazon 99.2%, GlobalSign 30.3%, Actalis 48.8%, TrustAsia 92.8%.
Figure 4. Each issuer’s served leaves by EKU, for the ten issuers serving the most domains.
These leaves follow the rules they were issued under, and they stay valid until they expire. The 2027 date governs what a CA may issue from then on.
The servers behind them
The leaves outside the profile come mostly from general-purpose web servers. The nginx server answers for 52.1% of them against 14.7% of all served leaves, and Apache for 21.2% against 12.7%. Platforms that issue certificates for their customers barely appear. Cloudflare’s server header is on 21.0% of all served leaves and on 501 of these 3,752,084. Squarespace’s is on 4.3% of all served leaves and on 8 of these.
Paired dot chart of the eight server header families whose share differs most between leaves outside the profile and every served leaf: nginx 14.7% of all and 52.1% outside, Cloudflare 21.0% and under 0.1%, Apache 12.7% and 21.2%, Squarespace 4.3% and under 0.1%, and four more.
Figure 5. Server header families: share of every served leaf against share of the leaves outside the profile.
By top-level domain
| TLD | Base | No EKU | CA leaf | No SAN | Outside the profile | clientAuth beside serverAuth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| .com | 102,296,421 | 1.5% | 0.7% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 4.1% |
| .de | 9,485,825 | 1.9% | 1.2% | 2.3% | 2.3% | 7.8% |
| .xyz | 8,341,476 | 1.9% | 0.2% | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.7% |
| .org | 6,913,964 | 2.0% | 1.5% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 4.3% |
| .net | 6,180,065 | 2.1% | 1.2% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 5.9% |
| .uk | 5,567,630 | 1.1% | 0.4% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 2.3% |
| .cn | 4,190,546 | 3.3% | 0.6% | 3.7% | 4.1% | 3.9% |
| .br | 3,369,485 | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 3.0% |
| .nl | 3,346,005 | 2.0% | 0.4% | 2.5% | 2.6% | 3.6% |
| .ru | 3,266,386 | 4.2% | 1.7% | 4.1% | 4.1% | 6.3% |
| .fr | 2,652,110 | 0.6% | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 1.7% |
| .it | 2,274,465 | 0.7% | 0.1% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 15.3% |
The table lists the twelve TLDs with the largest base, and each share is of that TLD’s own base. Under gTLDs 1.7% of leaves are outside the profile, and under ccTLDs 1.6%. Among the twelve, the share runs from 0.2% in .br to 4.1% in .ru. In .it, 15.3% of leaves carry clientAuth, almost four times the 4.1% in .com; in .xyz, 1.7% do, under half of .com’s share.
What the census can and can’t see
- The scan connected to each domain’s apex once, with that name in the TLS server name indication field, and kept the leaf the server chose to present. It didn’t visit www or any other subdomain, and it didn’t read the intermediate certificates.
- Bands come from the OID strings in the EKU extension as Node’s TLS library reports them, never from names. A leaf whose EKU lists serverAuth among other purposes counts as serverAuth. The census saw 130 distinct EKU lists.
- “Accepted” means the scanner’s TLS library verified the chain to its bundled roots and matched the domain’s name. When a leaf has no DNS name in a SAN, that library falls back to the CN and Chrome doesn’t. It accepted none of the CN-only leaves, so no figure here depends on the difference.
- Each rejected domain carries one error, the one the library reported. A leaf can have several faults, and a self-signed leaf that has also expired is reported as expired. The certificate check flags 3,148,167 of the leaves outside the profile as self-signed, while the library reported 2,170,144 of them that way.
- The month of issue is the certificate’s own start date. The census sees only leaves still being served when it ran.
- Where a domain was scanned twice, one row counts: graded before dead before unreachable before indeterminate, then the later pass. gTLD and ccTLD follow the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) root zone database’s type column.
- CAs are grouped by the organisation on the certificate, with older brands folded in: Starfield under GoDaddy, Comodo under Sectigo, and GeoTrust, Thawte and RapidSSL under DigiCert. The Let’s Encrypt group includes 567 leaves from its staging service, which browsers don’t trust, and 4 whose issuer only resembles its name. Other issuer names and common names appear only when they are a product’s own default or a tool’s placeholder text.
See your own
The free scan connects to your apex the same way the census did and reports whether the certificate it was handed is valid and trusted for your domain. The TLS pillar explains each warning.
Figures from the defaults.exposed census, data as of 2 November 2026. Census numbers move every month; the current values are on the census data page.